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RETROACTIVITY: PARAMOUNT POWERS AND
CONTRACTUAL CHANGES
GUIDO GALABRESIt
WHILE the constitutionality of retroactive laws has been much discussed by
courts and commentators," one situation has received relatively little treat-
ment. This is the situation arising when a law is passed which alters the effect
of existing contractual obligations of the federal government. That this prob-
lem has received little treatment is quite understandable. The constitutional
issue it poses is unique in that it might be viewed as anterior to that of the
"fairness" of the retroactive law, and to concern the very different problem
of the source of the government's power to alter its obligation. Most com-
mentators, have devoted their attention to the meaning of "fairness" in the
context of retroactivity, and accordingly have not paused to examine the ques-
tion of power.2 Yet it is worthy of some discussion, not only because it
sheds interesting light on an area where the Court might properly hold a close
rein on the activities of Congress, but also because the last time the issue
came up-in F.H.A. v. The Darlington, Inc.---it received a quite unsatisfactory
judicial treatment.
The Darlington case emerged from the incredible muddle of ill-drawn laws
that constitute the National Housing Act. In 1949 Darlington, Inc., a South
Carolina corporation, was formed to build an apartment house in Charleston.
It expected and received F.H.A. mortgage insurance to aid it in financing the
project. At the time the applicable section of the Housing Act, section 608,
contained no language expressly providing that buildings subject to federally
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1. See, e.g., Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HAv. L. REv. 692 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Con-
siderations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CA.tn. L. REv. 216 (1960).
2. Thus, for example, both Hochman, supra note 1, and Slawson, supra note 1, are
concerned with demonstrating, through examinations of the factors which courts appear to
weigh in these cases, that "fairness" is the ultimate test of the validity of retroactive laws.
Both authors bypass questions of the sources of legislative power to enact such laws, simply
assuming the power exists subject to due process limitations.
3. 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
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insured mortgages could be used only for residential purposes.4 Despite this
omission, it was relatively clear that the act was aimed at residential buildings;
the history of the act left little doubt, and regulations issued under the act
unequivocally provided, that mortgaged property should be "designed princi-
pally for residential uses." 5 Nevertheless, neither the regulations, nor the char-
ter of the corporation, nor the contract of insurance for the mortgage expressly
barred Darlington from occasionally renting to transients.
Unfortunately for Darlington, the apartment building did not prosper. In-
deed there is evidence that had the corporation not started to take in tran-
sients, bankruptcy and default of the mortgage would have been inevitable.
Only by renting to transients rooms which were not desired by permanent
residents was the company able to make a profit. Unlike some other companies
in similar positions, it was not able to get formal F.H.A. approval of this prac-
tice. Approved or not approved, occasional transient rentals continued.
In 1954 Congress enacted a law declaring that the National Housing Act
precluded the use of buildings subject to federally insured mortgages "for
transient or hotel purposes" and had done so from the very beginning.0
The new law, nevertheless, went on to provide that, whatever the law
had been prior to 1954, no building, whether new or previously built, which
was subject to a federally insured mortgage, could now be used for transient
purposes unless the F.H.A. had agreed in writing before May 28, 1954, to
allow such use.7 Congress was goaded into passing this law by irate represen-
tatives of the hotel industry who claimed that they were being injured by
4. The section merely provided, in pertinent part:
(b) To be eligible for insurance under this section a mortgage shall meet the
following conditions:
(1) The mortgaged property shall be held by a mortgagor approved by the
Commissioner. The Commissioner may, in his discretion, require such mortgagor
to be regulated or restricted as to rents or sales, charges, capital structure, rate of
return, and method of operation ....
(2) Preference or priority of opportunity in the occupancy of the mortgaged
property for veterans of World War II and their immediate families, and for hard-
ship cases as defined by the Commissioner, shall be provided under such regulations
and procedures as may be prescribed by the Commissioner ....
56 Stat. 303 (1942), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1743 (1958).
5. Development of property. At the time the mortgage is insured the mortgagor shall
have constructed and completed or shall be obligated to construct and complete new
housing accommodations on the mortgaged property designed principally for resi-
dential use, conforming to standards satisfactory to the Commissioner and consisting
of not less than eight (8) rentable dwelling units on one site and may be detached,
semidetached, or ranchhouses, or multifamily structures.
13 Fed. Reg. 8260 (1948) (repealed Dec. 18, 1958).
6. Housing Act of 1954, § 513, 68 Stat. 610, 12 U.S.C. § 1731b (1958).
7. The bill also barred any criminal penalties for violation of the no transient pro-
vision which had occurred before the effective date of the new law. 68 Stat. 611, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1731b(d) (1958). If Congress' interpretation of the pre-1954 law were correct, rental to
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"apartment house-hotels" cheaply financed through government insured mort-
gages under section 608. The hotel industry had brought to Congress' atten-
tion tales of enormous profits which allegedly had occurred in such govern-
ment backed "hotels"--tales which Congress was rather inclined to believe
in view of the general history of windfall profits under section 608 of the
Housing Act.8
Armed with the 1954 law, the FHA began to make life difficult for Darling-
ton, and the latter promptly sought a declaratory judgment justifying its rental
practices. Darlington argued that neither the pre-1954 law, nor any valid
regulations under it barred occasional rentals to transients so long as the com-
pany operated the property "principally" for residential use and so long as it
made apartments available to anyone who wanted them for extended, non-
transient use. The company further contended that the 1954 law itself was
unconstitutional for any of half-a-dozen reasons, beginning with its retroactive
nature and ending with its alleged discriminatory effect. 9 A three judge dis-
trict court '0 agreed with Darlington in most essentials and allowed limited
rentals to transients.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed by a five-to-three vote, Justice
Stewart taking no part. The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas was
transients would of course have been a criminal offense all along. But perhaps Congress
sensed due process objections would be made to convicting a person under a statute which
gave so little warning of the offense.
8. See, e.g., 100 CONG. REc. 12333, 12355 (1954) (remarks of Senator Capehart).
9. Darlington's principal arguments against the constitutionality of the 1954 amend-
ment were: (1) the amendment was retroactive legislation abridging vested rights and,
therefore, was in violation of the 5th amendment; (2) the law was enacted for the private
benefit of members of the American Hotel Association and arbitrarily and unreasonably
discriminated against Darlington; (3) Congress can act only for a valid public purpose
and the 1954 amendment furthered no public purpose.
10. The tangled history of the case in the lower court is perhaps worth noting. When
the case first came before him, District Judge Hoffman asked that a three-judge court be
convened because injunctive relief against enforcement of an Act of Congress was sought
on the ground that the act was unconstitutional. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958). The three judge
court concluded that the pleadings presented only a question of statutory construction and
that the pleadings also failed to disclose a case where an injunction would be the proper
form of relief. It, therefore, dismissed itself. 134 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
After the three-judge court had dissolved itself, Judge Hoffman, sitting alone, proceeded
to find that Darlington had a right to make occasional rentals to transients before 1954
and that the 1954 amendment could not retroactively take away the right. Judge Hoffman
further indicated his distaste for the 1954 amendment by finding it discriminatory in that
it was designed to relieve private interests and excepted resort areas such as the state of
Florida for no apparent reason. 142 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
The F.H.A. appealed directly to the Supreme Court which reversed the original order
of the three-judge court on the ground that the complaint had in fact stated a claim for
injunctive relief restraining enforcement of an Act of Congress on a constitutional issue
and that therefore a three judge court was needed. 352 U.S. 977 (1957). On remand from
this per curiam opinion, a three-judge court reconvened, substantially adopted Judge Hoff-
man's original opinion, and thereby paved the way for another F.H.A. appeal. 154 F. Supp.
411 (E.D.S.C. 1957).
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based on two essentially independent grounds. The first was that the Housing
Act, before the 1954 law was passed, implicitly if not explicitly barred rental
to transients. Had the Court said no more, Darlington would be a case of very
minor importance, decided on a dubious reading of statutes and regulations,
but warning builders that the enormous gaps and inconsistencies in housing
laws could work against as well as for them. This ground alone would have
accomplished-albeit gracelessly-what after all had been the major aim of
Congress all along.
The difficulty with Darlington is that the court did not stop there. The sec-
ond part of the majority opinion stated that whatever the exact meaning of the
law before 1954 may have been, Congress' 1954 act settled the matter. Justice
Douglas quickly dismissed the constitutional issue. In his view, even if the
pre-1954 law did not bar rentals to transients it certainly raised enough doubts
about them to preclude anyone from gaining a "vested right" to such rentals.
Moreover, he considered the housing industry so subject to government con-
trol--"regulation" was the word used-that anyone operating in it must ex-
pect further, prospective controls to be applied to what could be done with
existing buildings. To call such controls unconstitutionally retroactive, added
Mr. Justice Douglas, in what seemed almost a peroration, would be to cause
the ghost of Lochner 11 to rise again.
There were two dissents from the Court's opinion. Justice Frankfurter, though
joining Justice Harlan's longer opinion, added a few words of his own. After
reiterating his extreme reluctance to hold a law unconstitutional, the Justice
stated that the real question was whether the rights involved were vested and
that precedent compelled him to find that they were. No discussion of the
precedents cited or of the possible precedents going the other way on the issue
of "vestedness" was given.1 2 As to any other questions, the Justice referred
to Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion.
That opinion, in which Justice Whitaker also joined, was in many ways the
most interesting of the three. It began with a quick and assured rejection of
the Court's reading of the pre-1954 law. The original Housing Act and regu-
lations may very well have failed to give the right to rent to transients, said
the Justice, but they just as clearly did not bar such rentals. And that in fact
was the issue, since builders, like everyone else, are free to do what they like
11. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. justice Frankfurter simply cited three cases: Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100
(1947) (legislation retrospectively abrogating eviction judgments which landlords had ob-
tained during a 25 day gap in the Emergency Price Control Act held valid) ; Paramino
Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940) (private act of Congress authorizing review
of a workman's compensation award which had become final through expiration of time
for review held not to violate due process to the employer) ; Lynch v. United States, 292
U.S. 571 (1934) (congressional act rescinding war risk insurance contracts held invalid
as an impairment of vested rights). One can only conclude that he felt Darlington's rights
more akin to those of the holders of policies in the Lynch case than to the employer's right
in the finality of the arbitration award in Parandno or the right of a landlord in the eviction
judgments in Rhodes. But why he felt that way was not explained.
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with their property unless they either contract away that right or some law
excludes a particular use. Having disposed of that issue, Justice Harlan at-
tacked the 1954 law. The problem here, the Justice said, was whether Con-
gress could by a new law increase the obligations assumed by Darlington in
its 1949 contract with the government. If Congress were acting under some
general regulatory power, the new restrictions on Darlington might well be
valid. But Congress could not, merely because of its contractual relationship
with Darlington, alter its contract with the company. In reaching this conclusion
Justice Harlan relied on the earlier Supreme Court rulings in Lynch v. United
States 13 and Union Pacific Railroad Company v. United States.4 These
cases, he said, indicated that unless a paramount federal power, apart from
power to make contracts, supported a change the government was bound to
its agreement. The fact that it is sovereign does not increase its rights under
a contract any more than the fact that there is a contract limits the govern-
ment's sovereignty.', The question, then, as viewed by Justice Harlan, was not
so much one of the validity of retroactive legislation, but of the source of the
federal power to alter an existing contract.
The opinion indicated that if it had been some military necessity, for ex-
ample, which had required the barring of transients from buildings constructed
with federal help, Justice Harlan would have had no trouble upholding the
law involved in Darlington. The war power would have required the change,
and the language of Lynch that the government could not contract away its
rights as sovereign would seem clearly in point.16 One would expect therefore
that the majority in Darlington would have emphasized some paramount
power which required and justified the alteration of the contract. Instead, the
power to "regulate" seems simply to have been assumed. Yet it is hard to
13. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
14. 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (the "sinking fund" cases).
15. When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties there-
in are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private in-
dividuals.
292 U.S. at 579.
The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they
repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation . .. as it would be if the re-
pudiator had been a state or a municipality or a citizen.
99 U.S. at 719.
On the other hand, public and general acts of the federal government will be upheld as
valid although they may collaterally alter specific contracts. See, e.g., Horowitz v. United
States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925). For related issues arising from state impairment of contracts
see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
16. As Congress had the power to authorize the Bureau of War Risk Insurance to
issue them [i.e., insurance contracts], the due process .clause prohibits the United
States from annulling them, unless, indeed, the action taken falls within the federal
police power or some other paramount power.
292 U.S. at 579. See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (act requiring
wartime government contractors to renegotiate their contracts held a valid exercise of the
war power).
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escape the conclusion that if there is any problem with the Darlington case,
it must be on the ground that what Darlington was doing did not affect an
area sufficiently subject to federal power and interest, and not that the law
which sought to circumscribe Darlington's rental practices was unfairly retro-
active. Indeed, the fascinating thing about Darlington is that as recently as
three years ago three members of the Court could find no positive federal
power to support a change in a contract dealing with housing-and that if but
one other Justice sitting had agreed with them, an act of Congress would have
been voided-while the majority were so little troubled by the issue that they
did not even bother to discuss it. From all this one must assume that the
majority was either rejecting Justice Harlan's view that a paramount power is
necessary to alter a federal contract or that it had in mind a paramount federal
power so obvious as to require no mention.
Both of these possibilities deserve examination. What would it mean to reject
Justice Harlan's view that a paramount power is necessary? Before this question
can be answered, some discussion of the source of the government's power to
contract is needed.17 In the first place, the government can make contracts that
are necessary and proper for the carrying out of any of the specific clauses of
the Constitution. A contract to buy rifles under the war power might be an
example. But apart from these specific sources, another more general source
of the power to contract seems to exist in the power to tax and spend for the
general welfare. The history of this power and the long polemic on whether
the power to spend for the "general welfare" is limited to what is needed for
the carrying out of some specific power, or whether it comprehends anything
which works for the general good, need not be discussed here.'8 It is enough
to note that the latter, broader meaning has predominated for expenditure as
well as taxation, and that with it has come the right to make contracts regulat-
ing the activities of those who would receive the tax money expended.' 9 Thus,
for the public welfare, and by contract linked to expenditures, Congress can
do a fair amount of controlling in areas beyond its specific limited powers.20
17. Early cases and commentators were willing to uphold the power of the federal
government to enter contracts as simply an incident of sovereignty. See, e.g., United States
v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 114 (1831) ; 2 STORY, COxMNTAIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION
§ 1256, at 148 (5th ed. 1891). It would seem preferable to regard the broad capacity to
enter contracts as authorized by the necessary and proper clause or the power to spend
for the general welfare, for it has been held that the federal government has no inherent
or sovereign powers other than those specifically or explicitly granted to it by the Con-
stitution. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) ; Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906). But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
18. See, e.g., LAwSON, THE GENERAL WELFA CIAusE (1926) ; Nicholson, The Fed-
eral Spending Power, 9 TEMPLE L.Q. 3 (1934); Corwin, The Spending Power of Con-
gress-A Propos the Maternity Act, 36 HARv. L. REv. 548 (1923).
19. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936), with Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
20. It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it sub-
sidizes.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. Mc-
Cracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) ; Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907).
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Indeed, this was the way the Attorney General justified the original Housing
Act of 1938.21 But where the government regulates by contractual agreement,
it can not alter the rules except as the contract itself provides. At least, this
is the meaning of the rule in Lynch as interpreted by Harlan in Darlington.
The power to spend for the general welfare may well support a contract, but
some other power is needed to impose a new contract or a change in the con-
tract.
There is, however, no logical necessity about this analysis. One could argue
just as plausibly that the very "general welfare" power which supported the
contract allows the government to change it, if it is necessary for the common
good. If the original contract did not accomplish the aims for which the money
was to be spent, then Congress may certainly pass laws to see to it that the
money does what it was meant to do. Is not this "necessary and proper" to
the power to spend? Nor does this sanction injustice, the argument would
run. For the government will always be limited by the due process clause and
by the prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.
Thus the retroactive effect of such a law could be controlled, just as it would
be if Congress found it necessary-because of war-to alter the rights of
people with whom it had contracted in peace time. Under this reasoning all
of Justice Harlan's doubts become meaningless. The test is, as the Court im-
plied, one of fairness. And who is to say that, giving great deference to Con-
gress, the 1954 law shocks the conscience, especially in view of the history of
section 608? This meaning of Darlington quietly buries the notion that a pre-
cise paramount power is necessary.
Such a burial may give no cause for mourning if the only reason for the
paramount power rule is to ensure that the government act according to due
process standards, for the due process clause is quite up to that task without
the rule. And-after all-the Lynch case is not so clear or uncontradicted that
it cannot be bypassed. 22 But the rule has more to it than that, and it is for this
reason that one must hesitate before reading Darlington as destroying it. Al-
terations of government contracts are not desirable in a free country, even
when they do not constitute a "taking" of property or impinge on questions
of fundamental fairness of the type comprehended in due process. The gov-
ernment may make changes, but only if war or commerce require them and
21. 38 Ors. AVr'Y GEN. 258 (1935), noted in 4 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 144 (1935).
22. Finding the existence of a paramount power is, of course, one means of avoiding
the holding in Lynch. Cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). The Lynch case
leaves open still another portal for congressional escape from its holding- sovereign
immunity from suit. Justice Brandeis, the author of the opinion, suggests an ambiguous
dichotomy between "rights," which Congress cannot alter without the support of a para-
mount power, and "remedies," which presumably may be altered with impunity:
... Congress retained power to withdraw the consent [to be sued] at any time.
For consent to sue the United States is a privilege accorded; not the grant of a
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment .... [Ijmmunity from suit is an
attribute of sovereignty which may not be bartered away.
292 U.S. at 581-82.
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not on the broader and more ephemeral grounds that the general welfare
would be served by the change. Any other rule would allow the government
to welch almost at will. So viewed, the principles of Lynch, if not its exact
language, serve a distinct purpose. And while these principles could, of course,
be comprehended under a general due process test 23-due process can be
made to incorporate anything if one wishes hard enough-clarity of thought
might suggest that retaining a limitation such as that implicit in Lynch might
be more desirable.
How then, if one is to save part of the paramount power rule, can Darling-
ton be explained? The other alternative mooted-that the change in Darlington
was in fact supported by an obvious paramount federal power-must be con-
sidered. The power which springs most directly to mind is, of course, com-
merce. It would not be difficult to find in the commerce power-"broad as the
economic needs of the nation"' ' -rather than in a conglomeration of individual
contracts, the source of much of the federal intervention in the field of hous-
ing. But that is not quite the issue. For to satisfy the demands of the dis-
senters, the commerce power must support not housing legislation generally
but the particular change in the particular contract. And the dissenters evi-
dently are loath to see how it did that in Darlington.
Still, with a little imagination a relationship between the contract alteration
and interstate commerce can be found. 5 It can, in fact, be found in one of
Darlington's principal arguments for the law's invalidity. For the company
contended that the law was passed solely to help the hotel industry and, "there-
fore," was discriminatory legislation. Yet I can hardly doubt that if Congress
expressly found that hotels needed subsidies to survive, and that the survival
of hotels was essential to interstate commerce, a law granting such subsidies
would not only avoid the taint of discrimination, but would also find so solid
a backing in the commerce power that hardly any objection would be heard
in the Court. And I have very little doubt that if, instead of giving a direct
subsidy, Congress ordered that all buildings built with substantial government
aid stop competing with hotels which had received no such aid, this law, too,
would not be unconstitutionally discriminatory. It is equally hard to doubt the
basis in the commerce power for such a law. The question then would reduce
itself to whether the law was unfairly retroactive or constituted a taking of
property-questions which the Court presumably met with sufficient force in
Darlington.
Yet one cannot avoid the feeling that there is something fishy in all this. If
the issue were so simple, why would the Darlington case have come out the
other way with but one changed vote? And why would justices Frankfurter
23. See text accompanying note 37 infra. Cf. Hochman, supra note 1.
24. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HAv. L.
REv. 645, 883, 944 (1946). Cf. North.Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946).
25. Indeed, the ingenuity required is considerably less than that displayed by the same
Justice Harlan in finding support for the doings of Congress in the recent case of Flem-
ruing v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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and Harlan, usually so dedicated to carrying out the will of Congress-at al-
most any cost-have been so ready to void the 1954 law? The fishiness, of
course, is that Congress did not expressly link what it was doing to the com-
merce power. It did not say that hotels were in dire need, or that the need
presented a danger to interstate commerce, and neither did the Housing Ad-
ministration. As Justice Harlan put it,
I do not understand the Housing Administration to contend that the
United States possesses general regulatory power over appellee outside
the contractual relationship, and the Court has pointed to no such "para-
mount power" by which the imposition of the 1954 Act's prohibitions
might be justified in this case.2 6
But is it necessary that Congress or the Housing Administration spell out the
connection with commerce? Could not the Court, or the dissenters themselves,
make the link? For it would be the height of absurdity to force Congress in
every case to specify-by lofty preamble no doubt-that it is acting under a
particular power (subject to the penalty of having the law voided if it either
used inappropriate language, or picked the wrong power). This surely cannot
be the result that the dissenting Justices desired.2 7
But we must not be so hasty in branding what the dissenters seemed to be
looking for as absurd. To say that Congress had to make the link between
interstate commerce and what it was doing in Darlington is not to say that
Congress has to specify the power it is using, and why it is using it, in every
case. For Darlington involves two elements which may make congressional
specification desirable. In the first place, the connection between commerce
and the contract change, while possible, is not obvious. It requires stretching
the commerce power to its boundaries, albeit boundaries it has reached before.
There would be nothing odd for the Court in such a case to refuse to look for
a power which could be made to support the change. It could say instead that
it is true that the power might come from the commerce clause, but we will
not read the clause so broadly unless Congress-which is in possession of
more facts than we and which is responsible to the electorate-goes out on a
limb and says that the law is necessary because commerce demands it. In this
way the electorate is told clearly and directly why a step is taken and can
judge for itself whether Congress acted wisely.28
26. 358 U.S. at 98.
27. It is possible to read the Butler case, in the light of Wickard v. Filburn, as one
where Congress picked the wrong power. See note 20 supra. But there are so many dubious
explanations of the Butler case that it hardly seems worthwhile suggesting another. In
any event, the Court quite often has diligently searched for a power in order to uphold a
congressional act. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) ; United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). But cf.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
28. See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAxv. L. RFv. 40 (1961); Bickel
& Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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Analogies for such a decision in prior cases before the Supreme Court are easy
to find. Thus, in United States v. Yellow Cab Co.29 the Court, though it had
before it decisions that the Sherman Act reached as far as the commerce power
could extend, refused to apply the law to cabbies plying their trade between
hotels and railroad stations in the same city. It noted, however, that if Congress
expressly wanted the act to cover this activity and drew the link with com-
merce, such a law might well be valid.30 More recently, the Court has on sev-
eral occasions refused to follow what, in terms of statutory interpretation, was
clearly the will of Congress where to do so would violate traditional liberties
of the people.3 1 In taking this step the Court did not say that Congress could
not act that way. Nor did it say that Congress did not intend the result pro-
hibited. It said instead that if Congress wanted a result which so stretched its
powers, it had to say so clearly and unequivocally, so that the electorate might
know who was responsible for the law. What the dissenters wanted in Darl-
ington may, then, have been exactly this.32
In Darlington, the dissenters could well say, there is every reason to
force Congress to spell out the relationship of the 1954 law to a "paramount"
federal power. The law, after all, altered a contract. And if the rule against
altering contracts without a good and specific reason beyond a vague general
welfare is to have any meaning, then the link between the change and the
specific power must be either obvious or made so by appropriate congressional
findings. If the Court were allowed to ramble all over in search for a "para-
mount" power which might fit, then it would be as well to face the facts and
say that whenever the "general welfare" demands a change in a contract it can
be made. All this, of course, brings us back to the fact that in Darlington the
link was not obvious and required some stretching of the "paramount" power.
It also brings us back to the fact that the Court's opinion is virtually no help
in explaining just what the Court meant to be doing in the case.
Some readings of the Court's opinion can, however, be found which would
allow us to live with Darlington and still save important elements of the para-
mount power concept. In the first place one must recognize that there is a
crucial difference between the type of contract alteration which troubled the
Court in Lynch and Union Pacific and the change which occurred in Darling-
ton. For the fear expressed in the earlier cases stemmed from a concern with
the effect on the people of the government welching on its obligations-alter-
29. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
30. Id. at 232-33.
31. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958). Cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). But see Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 134, 137-40 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Black).
32. Justice Douglas, as the author of Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), is certainly
aware of the argument that in cases where the power of Congress is stretched, Congress
itself should do the stretching. But to him and to Justice Black it may well be that com-
merce is so broad as never to require stretching. Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332
U.S. 218 (1947). If so, the failure to worry over the link in Darlington may be under-
standable, but the alteration of contract aspect of the opinion remains to be explained.
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ing a contract for its own benefit. 33 And it was this fear which engendered
the rule that a paramount power, a good and sufficient reason for the change,
was needed to support any contract alteration. Darlington, one can readily see,
is quite another kettle of fish. Instead of benefiting the government financially,
the alteration in contract terms jeopardized its situation. Since it had insured
Darlington's mortgage, the government had everything to gain from Darling-
ton's continued solvency, and everything to lose from its bankruptcy.3 4 The
contract change made it difficult for Darlington to stay in the black; the case
can hardly be termed one of government welching. And if it isn't a case of
welching, is it really so terribly important to put obstacles beyond those of
due process fairness in the way of government alteration of the contract? In-
deed, one might almost assume that if the government chose to pass a law
altering its own contract where the alteration brought it no gain, it must have
had a reason founded either in the "general welfare" or in some "paramount
power," whether or not Congress specified the grounds in passing the law.
For otherwise, why should it have acted?
Here then lies a possible explanation for Darlington, though admittedly one
which the Court does not give in its opinion. In fact here lie two possible read-
ings of Darlington, which, though closely related, retain some differences. The
33. In Lynch, for example, the Court seemed primarily concerned with the motive of
Congress:
, . . Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual
obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen
government expenditures, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of re-
pudiation.
292 U.S. at 580.
The Court employed similar language in refusing to allow Congress to modify a gold
bond of the United States nd declaring the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, taking the
United States off the gold standard, unconstitutional:
By virtue of the power to borrow money "on the credit of the United States," the
Congress is authorized to pledge that credit as an assurance of payment as stipulated,
as the highest assurance the government can give, its plighted faith. To say that the
Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge is to assume that the Constitution
contemplates a vain promise .... This Court has given no sanction to such a con-
ception of the obligations of our government.
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 351 (1935). But cf. the right-remedy distinction in
Lynch, supra note 22.
34. According to the findings of the District Court, all the parties concerned would
end up losing money because of the contractual alteration: Darlington would default on
the mortgage and lose its equity in the property; the government, as insurer of the mort-
gage, would have to pay the mortgagee the difference between the amount of the mortgage
and the amount realized at a foreclosure sale; and since the building could not be run profit-
ably as an apartment house, the only logical course would be to convert it into a hotel-a
development that would give the Charleston hotel operators even stiffer competition. 142
F. Supp. at 350.
Situations could be imagined where the legislative change would bring offsetting gain
to the government as well as immediate financial loss. There is no evidence in the record
that this was the case in Darlington.
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first reading is more in accord with Justice Harlan's view of Lynch. No contract
change can be made unless a specific power outside the power to spend for the
general welfare supports the change. Moreover, if the contract change benefits
the government, Congress will be required to spell out why the change is re-
quired and what power requires it. If, instead, the change is not to the govern-
ment's financial advantage, then the Court will be free to presume-as it may
be said to have done in Darlington and as it does for most laws-that the
change was required by commerce, war or whatever specific power seems to
fit.3 5 Of course, if no power at all can be found, the law altering the contract
will fall. But a connection, even as tenuous as the one in Darlington, might
well suffice. 36 It would naturally be open to those challenging the law to show
that the possible connection was not realistic. But the road would not be made
easier just because a change in a government contract was involved.
The second reading, while inconsistent with Justice Harlan's views, seeks to
accomplish many of the same objectives. Rather than requiring a paramount
power to alter a contract, Darlington could be taken as admitting that the general
welfare-the expenditure power-itself can back a change. But general wel-
fare means something more than benefiting the government financially. And
indeed, the existence of financial benefit to the government creates a suspicion,
if not a presumption, that the change was attempted solely for that reason.
Thus, when the government benefits from the change, a good and sufficient
other reason is needed before the change will be upheld-a reason not neces-
sarily grounded in the specific powers of the government but at least based on
a notion of "general welfare" which excludes the justification that it benefits
the government's purse. And Congress must spell out the reason so that the
Court can judge for itself whether Congress is welching or genuinely acting
for the public good. If, instead, the change does not help the government
financially, the presumption is that the law was passed for the general welfare
and no spelling out of reasons by Congress is needed. The change, of course,
is still subject to due process standards but need meet no other more stringent
tests.
35. This reading would incorporate the normal presumption in favor of the legislature:
... the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,
for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone).
36. Of 'course, this reading and the readings which follow in the text do not meet the
argument that the commerce power was being stretched so much in Darlington that Con-
gress should have specified the connection between a paramount power and the contractual
change. But where commerce is concerned-after and perhaps because of the fall of the old
court-this argument may be viable in only the most extreme cases. See note 32 supra. In
any event the Yellow Cab and Kent v. Dulles line of cases has already survived an occa-
sional deviation. Compare Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134, 137-40 (1959)
(dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black), with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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Under either of these readings, the Darlington decision can be reconciled
with the retention of substantial control by the Court over attempts by the
government to alter contracts for its own financial benefit. But each has some
substantial disadvantages. The first reading would uphold laws altering con-
tracts-even where the government benefited financially-so long as Congress
made a connection with a paramount power and the change neither constituted
a taking nor was so unfair as to violate due process. The fact that the needs
of the paramount power were relatively slight and the unfairness involved
relatively great would not matter. On the other hand, this reading might lead
to the invalidation of a desirable change which caused practically no unfair-
ness, merely because Congress failed to mention a specific power and some
slight financial gain occurred. Worse, it might void a change which substan-
tially served the general welfare and added nothing to the governmental coffer,
but-nmirabile dictu-could be attached to no specific federal power. In other
words, this reading might give the court desirable power with one hand, but
take away equally desirable flexibility with the other.
The second reading has the advantage of being more flexible. Contract
changes may be upheld so long as no financial benefit accrues to the govern-
ment even though no link to a particular power exists. More important, even
if financial benefit exists, a positive connection by Congress between the
change and some need of the general public apart from the money saved will
validate the law. But even this reading makes it difficult to take into account
some relevant factors. The degree of fairness involved-so long as it stops
short of due process levels-is ignored. The extent to which the government
is lining its own pockets and the strength of the needs of the general welfare
are not weighed. The rule remains, to a substantial extent, mechanical.
Of course, more flexibility could be read into these rules. Each of the rele-
vant factors could be weighed. But then the Court would be applying a test
indistinguishable from due process. More consideration than is usual might
perhaps be given to the factor of governmental "welching" for financial benefit,
but the method of decision would involve the same balancing of unbalance-
ables. If this is done, it would seem best to erase the thin line of distinction
and employ due process directly. After all, due process itself can take into
account the problems implicit in government benefit from unilateral changes of
contracts and balance them against the needs of the particular paramount
power or of the general welfare, all the while spicing the mixture with a good
dose of the unfairness to the parties involved. Indeed, due process better than
either of the readings suggested can rank the paramount powers and thus
evaluate the need for changes in a government contract.
If this be the case, why not use due process? The answer is not easy to
verbalize. If I believed that the Court was ready to overturn financially-moti-
vated alterations in federal contracts under the due process clause, I would
think that test by far the most desirable. But the recent history of due process
-especially, but not exclusively, in economic affairs-provides scant cause for
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comfort.37 It is too easy when one balances everything to decide that one can
evaluate nothing. And the frustration inherent in such a situation often leads
to the abrupt conclusion that Congress knows best. The law is upheld, and
perhaps flexibility has been bought at too high a price. For flexibility which
leads to inaction may well be worse than rigidity which occasionally goes
wrong but brings about desirable results in most cases.
The majority opinion in Darlington underscores the danger. Concerned as
he is with the broad concept of fairness, Justice Douglas examines none of
the specific factors that would seem crucial. Perhaps the result he reaches is
the proper one for the case. I am inclined to think so, essentially because of
the lack of financial motivation in the government's contractual change. But
it is hard to escape the conclusion that Justice Harlan, though wrong, came
far closer to the important issues before the Court, simply because his frame
of reference was the specific and rather rigid one of the existence of a para-
mount power.
37. See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) ; Levine v. United States, 362
U.S. 610 (1960). Cf. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Nelson v. County
of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
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